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Q2 2002
General Q2 April, June, or August 2002: Al Jazeera Reporter Claims to Conduct Interview with 9/11 Masterminds Ramzi bin al-Shibh. FBI It is originally reported that Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda interviews 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and 9/11 associate Ramzi Bin al-Shibh at a secret location in Karachi, Pakistan, in either June TIMES, 9/8/2002 or August. 9/9/2002 Details and audio footage of the interview come out between September 8 and 12, 2002. The video footage of the interview al-Qaeda promised to hand over is never given to Al Jazeera. PRESS, 9/8/2002 Both figures claim the 9/11 attacks were originally going to target nuclear reactors, but “decided against it for fear it would go out of control.” Interviewer Fouda is struck that KSM and bin al-Shibh remember only the hijackers’ code names, and have trouble remembering their real names. 9/9/2002 KSM, who calls himself the head of al-Qaeda’s military committee and refers to bin al-Shibh as the coordinator of the “Holy Tuesday” operation, reportedly acknowledges “and, yes, we did it.” AND FIELDING, 2003, PP. 38 These interviews “are the first full admission by senior figures from bin Laden’s network that they carried out the September 11 attacks.” TIMES, 9/8/2002 Some, however, call Fouda’s claims into doubt. For example, the Financial Times states: “Analysts cited the crude editing of interview tapes and the timing of the broadcasts as reasons to be suspicious about their authenticity. Dia Rashwan, an expert on Islamist movements at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies in Cairo, said: ‘I have very serious doubts the authenticity of this tape. It could have been a script written by the FBI.’” TIMES, 9/11/2002 KSM is later variously reported to be arrested in June 2002, killed or arrested in September 2002, and then arrested in March 2003. After this last arrest report, for the first time Fouda claims this interview took place in April, placing it safely before the first reports of KSM’s capture. 3/4/2003; CTV TELEVISION, 3/6/2003 Bin al-Shibh also gets captured several days after Fouda’s interview is broadcast, and some reports say he is captured because this interview allows his voice to be identified. 9/15/2002; CBS NEWS, 10/9/2002 As a result, Fouda has been accused of betraying al-Qaeda, and now fears for his life. 9/17/2002 As the Washington Post states, “Now Al Jazeera is also subject to rumors of a conspiracy.” POST, 9/15/2002 Yet after being so reviled by al-Qaeda supporters, Fouda is later given a cassette said to be a bin Laden speech. 11/18/2002 US officials believe the voice on that cassette is “almost certainly” bin Laden, but one of the world’s leading voice-recognition institutes said it is 95 percent certain the tape is a forgery. 11/18/2002; BBC, 11/29/2002 It will later be revealed that details of the interview were told to the CIA in mid-June 2002, which directly resulted in bin al-Shibh’s arrest a few months later (see June 14, 2002 and Shortly After). Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama bin Laden, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Al-Qaeda, Yosri Fouda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements Early 2002 or After: US Places Listening Devices in Remote Tribal Areas of Pakistan At some unknown time after US-allied forces conquer Afghanistan in late 2001, a US special operations team known as Task Force Orange slips into the tribal areas of Pakistan to plant listening devices on mountain peaks. These devices are used because US spy satellites reportedly do not have antennas sensitive enough to pick up cell phone or hand-held radio transmissions. These devices have reportedly helped in some cases to locate al-Qaeda operatives. 8/28/2007 Entity Tags: Task Force Orange Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Pakistan and the ISI, Afghanistan, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region Spring-Late 2002: CIA Videotapes Interrogations of High Value Detainees The CIA videotapes interrogations of high-value al-Qaeda detainees. The interrogations of at least two detainees are taped. One of the detainees is Abu Zubaida, who helped run a training camp in Afghanistan (see March 28, 2002 and Mid-May 2002 and After). INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 12/6/2007 Another is Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, chief of al-Qaeda operations in the Arabian peninsula (see Early October 2002 and Shortly After Early October 2002). YORK TIMES, 12/8/2007 The tapes run to a “couple hundred hours,” and mostly show 24 hour a day coverage of Zubaida in his cell. However, some portions show aggressive interrogations, including waterboarding. According to one source, full transcripts are not made, although summaries are drafted and sent back to CIA headquarters. NEWS, 12/13/2007; WASHINGTON POST, 12/18/2007 Another source says the opposite, “A detailed written transcript of the tapes’ contents—apparently including references to interrogation techniques—was subsequently made by the CIA.” 12/11/2007 However, after tapes of Zubaida and al-Nashiri’s interrogations are destroyed in 2005 (see November 2005), some tapes are still in existence (see September 19 and October 18, 2007), suggesting that either not all tapes of their interrogations are destroyed, or that one or more other detainees are videotaped. Another detainee whose interrogations may be taped is Ramzi bin al-Shibh, because he is the most important remaining al-Qaeda leader who is captured during this time period (see June 13-September 25, 2000 and September 11, 2002). In addition, at least one audio recording is also made. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 10/25/2007 According to a statement by CIA Director Michael Hayden, the interrogations are recorded because “new” procedures are used during the interrogations and the tapes are “meant chiefly as an additional, internal check on the program in its early stages.” The videotaping apparently ends in 2002. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 12/6/2007 Another reason for the videotaping is said to be Abu Zubaida’s poor medical condition - he was shot several times during the operation to capture him. An intelligence official will later say, “There were concerns that there be a record of his medical treatment and condition in the event that he died.” NEWS, 12/13/2007 However, there are various allegations these detainees are tortured (see Mid-May 2002 and After, June 16, 2004, Shortly After September 6, 2006, and March 10-April 15, 2007). Some of the tapes are destroyed in 2005 (see November 2005) and there will be a media and political outcry when this is revealed in 2007 (see December 6, 2007). Entity Tags: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Michael Hayden, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Abu Zubaida, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics Between April 2002 and November 2005:: CIA Interrogation Videos Held Overseas Despite Security Risk CIA videotapes of detainee interrogations are held overseas and not sent back to CIA headquarters from the time they are made (see Spring-Late 2002) until the time they are destroyed (see November 2005). They are stored in a safe at the CIA station in the country or countries where the interrogations are performed. Given that there is concern about keeping such highly classified material overseas, it is unclear why the tapes are not sent to the US for security reasons. YORK TIMES, 12/19/2007 However, portions of the tapes are transmitted to the US so they can be viewed by CIA managers (see Between April 2002 and November 2005). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics May-Early June 2002: US Filmmaker Sees Hundreds of Taliban and Al-Qaeda Living Openly in Pakistan A US filmmaker is able to penetrate al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Pakistan. John Christopher Turner is a US citizen from Missouri, but he lived in Pashtun tribal areas and fought with the mujaheddin against the Soviets in neighboring Afghanistan in the 1980s, speaks fluent Pashto, converted to Islam, and has a long beard. As a result, traveling under the protection of a clan chief, he is able to penetrate the province of Baluchistan in the far west of Pakistan. Turner will later tell the Washington Post that Baluchistan “is where the Taliban and al-Qaeda are comfortably living right now. There’s nobody trying to run them off. In fact, they’re honored guests.… I probably went to ten hornets’ nests, and there were always two or three al-Qaeda in supervisory positions—overseeing, I’d say; the last thing you can do is boss a Pashtun. But obviously they were conduits for money.” He claims to have seen hundreds of Taliban living openly in Baluchistan, with a smaller number of al-Qaeda who are using posing as charity workers. He also runs into al-Qaeda operatives elsewhere. “There are madrassas schools right outside Karachi that are full of al-Qaeda. You go to any madrassa and the al-Qaeda are out there.” He claims to have long philosophical discussions with al-Qaeda figures, and shoots extensive video footage of the militants he meets. US officials say they find Turner’s account credible. ISI agents followed Turner to the vicinity of al-Qaeda safe houses in north Karachi. Turner is extensively interrogated by the FBI after returning from Baluchistan, and they also watch the video footage from his trip. He is put on a plane back to the US. The documentary Turner is planning about his Pakistan trip apparently is never made, as there are no subsequent references to it. POST, 8/4/2002 Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, John Christopher Turner Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region Mid-May 2002 and After: CIA Waterboards and Tortures Al-Qaeda Leader Abu Zubaida Abu Zubaida. New York Times The CIA begins interrogating captured al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002), using some aggressive techniques that are commonly considered to be torture. Zubaida was initially interrogated by the FBI using traditional rapport-building techniques, and many believe the FBI was obtaining valuable information (see Late March through Early June, 2002). But he is being held at a secret CIA prison in Thailand (see March 2002), and soon a new CIA team comes in and takes over (see Mid-April 2002). This team, led by controversial psychologist James Elmer Mitchell, uses such extreme methods that the FBI completely withdraws its personnel (see Mid-April-May 2002), and even some CIA personnel leave in disgust (see Between Mid-April and Mid-May 2002). By mid-May, Mitchell’s detractors are gone and the gunshot wounds Zubaida sustained during his capture have stabilized, so Mitchell begins applying even more aggressive interrogation techniques. 2003, PP. 186, 191; SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 110-115 According to one psychologist involved in Zubaida’s interrogation, Mitchell argues that Zubaida needs to be reduced to a state of “learned helplessness.” Reserve Air Force Colonel Steve Kleinman, an experienced interrogator very familiar with Mitchell, will later say that “learned helplessness was his whole paradigm.… It starts with isolation. Then they eliminate the prisoners’ ability to forecast the future—when their next meal is, when they can go to the bathroom. It creates dread and dependency. It was the KGB model. But the KGB used it to get people who had turned against the state to confess falsely. The KGB wasn’t after intelligence.” YORKER, 8/6/2007 Journalist Ron Suskind will later claim: “According to CIA sources, Zubaida was waterboarded, a technique in which a captive’s face is covered with a towel as water is poured atop, creating the sensation of drowning. He was beaten, though not in a way to worsen his injuries. He was repeatedly threatened, and made certain of his impending death. His medication was withheld. He was bombarded with deafening, continuous noise and harsh lights.” 2006, PP. 115 The New York Times will later claim: “At times, Mr. Zubaida, still weak from his wounds, was stripped and placed in a cell without a bunk or blankets. He stood or lay on the bare floor, sometimes with air-conditioning adjusted so that, one official said, Mr. Zubaida seemed to turn blue. At other times, the interrogators piped in deafening blasts of music by groups like the Red Hot Chili Peppers.” YORK TIMES, 9/10/2006 Zubaida will reportedly later tell the Red Cross that he was also kept for a prolonged period in a cage, known as a “dog box,” so small that he unable to stand. YORKER, 8/6/2007 The CIA will claim that these aggressive methods are very effective, and soon it will begin using them on many other detainees. But others will later suggest that Zubaida gave up far less valuable information under torture than he did with the FBI’s rapport-building techniques (see June 2002). The legal authority to conduct these types of interrogations is unclear. The CIA is being advised by Michael Chertoff at the Justice Department, but there will be no formal legal opinion permitting the techniques until August 2002. YORK TIMES, 9/10/2006 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, James Elmer Mitchell, Abu Zubaida, Steve Kleinman Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics Mid-May 2002 and After: CIA Headquarters Approves and Closely Monitors Zubaida’s Torture In 2007, former CIA official John Kiriakou will claim to have details about the interrogation of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida. Kiriakou was involved in the capture and early detention of Zubaida (see March 28, 2002), but claims he was transferred to another task before harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding were used on him (see Mid-May 2002 and After). NEWS, 12/10/2007 Kiriakou will claim that the activities of the interrogators were closely directly by superiors at CIA Headquarters back in the US. “It wasn’t up to individual interrogators to decide, ‘Well, I’m gonna slap him.’ Or, ‘I’m going to shake him.’ Or, ‘I’m gonna make him stay up for 48 hours.’ Each one of these steps, even though they’re minor steps, like the intention shake, or the open-handed belly slap, each one of these had to have the approval of the deputy director for operations.… The cable traffic back and forth was extremely specific. And the bottom line was these were very unusual authorities that the CIA got after 9/11. No one wanted to mess them up. No one wanted to get in trouble by going overboard. So it was extremely deliberate.” NEWS, 12/10/2007 Kiriakou also will say, “This isn’t something done willy-nilly. This isn’t something where an agency officer just wakes up in the morning and decides he’s going to carry out an enhanced technique on a prisoner. This was a policy made at the White House, with concurrence from the National Security Council and the Justice Department” (see Mid-March 2002). TIMES, 12/12/2007 In 2005, ABC News reported, “When properly used, the interrogation techniques appear to be closely monitored and are signed off on in writing on a case-by-case, technique-by-technique basis, according to highly placed current and former intelligence officers involved in the program.” NEWS, 11/18/2005 CIA Director George Tenet will similarly claim in a 2007 book that the interrogation of high-ranking prisoners like Zubaida “was conducted in a precisely monitored, measured way…” He will also say that “CIA officers came up with a series of interrogation techniques that would be carefully monitored at all times to ensure the safety of the prisoner. The Bush administration and the Department of Justice were fully briefed and approved the use of these tactics.” 2007, PP. 242 Zubaida’s interrogations are videotaped at the time (see Spring-Late 2002), and CIA Director Michael Hayden will later claim this was done “meant chiefly as an additional, internal check on the interrogation program in its early stages.” INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 12/6/2007 The videotapes will later be destroyed under controversial circumstances (see November 2005). Entity Tags: John Kiriakou, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, George J. Tenet, White House Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics June 26, 2002-January 24, 2003: Owners of Florida Flight Schools Attended by Hijackers in Separate Air Crashes The crash of Arne Kruithof’s plane at Venice Municipal Airport. Public domain Within the space of seven months, the owners of two Venice, Florida flight schools attended by several of the alleged 9/11 suicide pilots are separately in serious air accidents. On June 26, 2002, Arne Kruithof, whose Florida Flight Training Center was attended by Ziad Jarrah, survives a crash at the Venice Municipal Airport. He is a passenger in a twin-engine plane, which suddenly pulls to the left when about 50 feet off the runway and the pilot is unable to regain control. All the passengers are uninjured, but the plane is damaged extensively. GONDOLIER SUN, 6/29/2002 On January 24, 2003, Rudi Dekkers, whose Huffman Aviation was attended by Marwan Alshehhi and Mohamed Atta, crashes his helicopter. He is flying to work early in the morning for a meeting with a competitor, to sell his flight school to them. Ten minutes after takeoff, his engine cuts out and he crashes into a river. He is rescued from the ice-cold water by a friend and fellow helicopter pilot who pulls him to shore. He arrives in Venice later in the day, and is able to proceed with the sale of Huffman Aviation. Two days earlier, the Associated Press had announced that Dekkers was to be arrested on felony fraud charges (see August 23, 2001-April 2004). PRESS, 1/22/2003; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1/24/2003; VENICE GONDOLIER SUN, 1/25/2003; NAPLES DAILY NEWS, 1/25/2003; SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 1/28/2003 Entity Tags: Huffman Aviation, Rudi Dekkers, Arne Kruithof Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events Mid-2002: Al-Qaeda Operatives with WMD Connections Interviewed but Remain Free in Sudan In November 2001, the Sudanese allowed the FBI to interview two al-Qaeda operatives living in Sudan, Mohammed Loay Bayazid, and Mubarak al Duri (see November 2001). Even though both men had links to al-Qaeda dating back to the 1980s (Bayazid even was one of al-Qaeda’s founding members), CIA Director George Tenet will later claim that the FBI agents “reported back that, although their suspicions were great, they were unable to develop sufficient grounds for a case against either man that would justify an extradition request.” But the CIA continues to find more intelligence that appears to tie both of them to al-Qaeda efforts to get weapons of mass destruction. For instance, a trusted informant claims Bayazid helped in an effort to buy uranium for bin Laden (see Late 1993). Tenet claims that “Both men had developed business connections to Sudanese WMD-related entities, and both had established businesses that could have served as dual-use front companies for developing nuclear and biological weapons.” In mid-2002, the CIA tries to get the two men to change sides. CIA officer Rolf Mowatt-Larssen goes to Sudan and is allowed to speak with them in a neutral location. But both men are unrepentant. After an appeal to help uncover al-Qaeda’s WMD program to potentially save millions of lives, one of them replies, “No… I think it is legitimate to kill millions of you because of how many of us you killed.” 2007, PP. 270-271 There have been no reports since of the US capturing or killing either man or putting them on any public wanted lists. Entity Tags: Mohammed Loay Bayazid, Al-Qaeda, Mubarak al Duri, Central Intelligence Agency, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 April 2002 May 2002 June 2002 June 2002: Former FBI Translator Files Whistleblower Suit Against Justice Department Former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds files a lawsuit against the Justice Department. She alleges that the government leaked confidential information about her to the media in violation of the Privacy Act, and that it also violated her free speech and due process rights when it fired her in retaliation for her having reported possible illegal activity by co-worker Melek Can Dickerson and other security and management problems in the FBI’s language department. She is suing for monetary damages and reinstatement of her contract with the Bureau. 7/7/2004 Dickerson and her husband Douglas Dickerson are subpoenaed in the case and the Justice Department is ordered by the court not to allow the couple to leave the country. (.COM), 7/1/2004 Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Melek Can Dickerson, Douglas Dickerson, Sibel Edmonds Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds June 2002: Italian Authorities Hear Former CIA Informer Plot to ‘Eliminate the Enemies of God’ Italian authorities monitoring a cell of Islamist extremists based in Milan, Italy, overhear one of the radicals plotting to create a new trans-European network. The surveillance target, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, who previously informed for the CIA in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After), tells an unidentified man that they will use the network to “eliminate the enemies of God.” News of the network, which is to be based in Britain, causes the Italians to place Nasr under round the clock surveillance. 2006, PP. 236-41 Nasr will subsequently be kidnapped by the CIA (see Noon February 17, 2003). Entity Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Italy, Remote Surveillance June 2002: US Declines Chance to Strike Al-Zarqawi Camp in Northern Iraq An aerial photo of the Khurmal training camp, actually in the nearby village of Sargat. This image was shown during Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN on February 5, 2003. Public domain, via National Security Archive US intelligence determines that Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has recently moved to a part of northern Iraq controlled by Kurdish rebels, and his militant group has set up a chemical weapons lab there. The lab, located near the town of Khurmal, allegedly produces ricin and cyanide. 3/2/2004 By early 2002, al-Zarqawi had been identified as a significant terrorist target, based on intelligence that he ran an important training camp in Afghanistan (see Early 2000-December 2001) and had already unsuccessfully attempted plots against Israeli and European targets. CIA intelligence indicates al-Zarqawi is in the camp, along with many al-Qaeda fighters who had recently fled from US air strikes in Afghanistan. Additionally, there are preparations and training in the camp for new attacks on Western interests. STREET JOURNAL, 10/25/2004 The US military draws up plans to attack the site with cruise missiles, and the plans are sent to the White House. However, NBC News will later report that, “according to US government sources, the plan was debated to death in the National Security Council.” 3/2/2004 Officials involved in the planning expect a swift decision, but are surprised when weeks go by without any response from the White House. Finally, information is somehow leaked to the media in Turkey that the US is considering targeting the camp, and intelligence shows that al-Zarqawi and his group flee the camp soon thereafter. STREET JOURNAL, 10/25/2004 Entity Tags: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, US Military, White House, National Security Council Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 June 2002: CIA Claims to Get Vital Intelligence from Torture of Zubaida, but Others Claim His Leads Are Mostly Vague and Useless In May 2002, the CIA began using new torture techniques on captured al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see Mid-May 2002 and After), and by June senior CIA officials prepare a preliminary report to determine whether Zubaida’s confessions are accurate or not. According to author Gerald Posner, they “found nothing that could definitively prove Zubaida a liar. And they had uncovered some minor corroborating evidence about the times and places of the meetings he had mentioned, which meant he could be telling the truth.” 2003, PP. 192 Vanity Fair will later comment that the “CIA would go on to claim credit for breaking Zubaida, and celebrate James Mitchell”—the psychologist who devised the torture techniques used on Zubaida by the CIA (see Late 2001-Mid-March 2002, January 2002 and After, and Mid-April 2002)—“as a psychological wizard who held the key to getting hardened terrorists to talk. Word soon spread that Mitchell and business partner Bruce Jessen had been awarded a medal by the CIA for their advanced interrogation techniques. While the claim is impossible to confirm, what matters is that others believed it. The reputed success of the tactics was ‘absolutely in the ether,’ says one Pentagon civilian who worked on detainee policy.” FAIR, 7/17/2007 Much Intelligence Comes from His Possessions and FBI Interrogations - However, the reliability of Zubaida’s confessions remains controversial years later, and several factors complicate accessing their impact. For one, it appears that some of his most important confessions took place a month earlier when the FBI was interrogating him using rapport building instead of torture (see Late March through Early June, 2002). What the New York Times calls his two most notable confessions—that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the 9/11 mastermind and giving up the name of Jose Padilla, a militant living in the US—appear to come from this earlier period, although some accounts conflict. YORK TIMES, 6/27/2004; SUSKIND, 2006, PP. 116-117; NEW YORK TIMES, 9/10/2006; VANITY FAIR, 7/17/2007 Furthermore, it is often not clear what was obtained from Zubaida’s confessions and what was obtained from his possessions. Journalist Ron Suskind will later write: “The phone numbers, computers, CDs, and e-mail address seized at Zubaida’s apartment now—a month after his capture—began to show a yield.… These higher-quality inputs were entered into big Cray supercomputers at NSA; many then formed the roots of a surveillance tree—truck to branches to limbs and buds.” 2006, PP. 116-117 So while it is said that information from Zubaida helped lead to the capture of al-Qaeda figures such as Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Omar al-Faruq, and Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi, it is unclear where this information came from exactly. POST, 6/27/2004 Additionally, it is not even clear if he provided such leads. For instance, it has been reported that the main break that led to bin al-Shibh’s capture had nothing to do with Zubaida (see June 14, 2002 and Shortly After). 9/7/2006 Zubaida Describes Vague and Unverifiable Plots - By most accounts, Zubaida’s confessions under torture around this time are frustratingly vague. He describes many planned attacks, such as al-Qaeda attacks on US shopping malls, banks, supermarkets, water systems, nuclear plants, apartment buildings, the Brooklyn Bridge, the Statue of Liberty, and more. Red alerts are sounded and thousands of law enforcement personnel are activated each time, but the warnings are too vague to lead to any arrests. Suskind will later comment that Zubaida’s information was “maybe nonsense, maybe not. There was almost no way to tell.” 2006, PP. 115-116, 121 But Suskind will later say more definitively: “Zubaida said, as people will, anything to make the pain stop. And we essentially followed every word and various uniformed public servants of the United States went running all over the country to various places that Zubaydah said were targets, and were not. Ultimately, we tortured an insane man and ran screaming at every word he uttered.” 9/7/2006 Posner claims that Zubaida provided “false information intended to misdirect his captors.” For instance, “He caused the New York police to deploy massive manpower to guard the Brooklyn Bridge at the end of May 2002, after he told his interrogators that al-Qaeda had a plan to destroy ‘the bridge in the Godzilla movie.’” 2003, PP. 191 Link between Iraq, al-Qaeda - Perhaps the most important claims Zubaida makes, at least from the viewpoint of Bush administration officials, are his allegations of an operational relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Some of Zubaida’s claims will later be leaked by administration officials, particularly his assertion that Osama bin Laden’s ally Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was working directly with Saddam Hussein to destabilize the autonomous Kurdish regime in northern Iraq (see December 2001-Mid-2002, October 2, 2002, and January 28, 2003). A former Pentagon analyst will later say: “I first saw the reports soon after Abu Zubaida’s capture. There was a lot of stuff about the nuts and bolts of al-Qaeda’s supposed relationship with the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The intelligence community was lapping this up, and so was the administration, obviously. Abu Zubaida was saying Iraq and al-Qaeda had an operational relationship. It was everything the administration hoped it would be.” Another Pentagon analyst will recall: “As soon as I learned that the reports had come from torture, once my anger had subsided I understood the damage it had done. I was so angry, knowing that the higher-ups in the administration knew he was tortured, and that the information he was giving up was tainted by the torture, and that it became one reason to attack Iraq.” FAIR, 12/16/2008 Zubaida Appears to Be Feeding Interrogators' Expectations - Dan Coleman, the FBI’s top al-Qaeda expert at the time who was able to analyze all the evidence from Zubaida, will later claim that the CIA “got nothing useful from the guy.” QUARTERLY, 12/14/2007 Coleman will say: “The CIA wants everything in five minutes. It’s not possible, and it’s not productive. What you get in that circumstance are captives and captors playing to each other’s expectations, playing roles, essentially, that gives you a lot of garbage information and nothing you can use.” 2006, PP. 114 Given his low position in the jihadist hierachy, Coleman will add, Zubaida “would not have known that if it was true. But you can lead people down a course and make them say anything.” FAIR, 12/16/2008 Counterterrorism “tsar” General Wayne Downing is apparently intimately involved in Zubaida’s interrogation and will later recall: “Zubaida and some of the others are very clever guys. At times I felt we were in a classic counter-interrogation class: They were telling us what they think we already knew. Then, what they thought we wanted to know. As they did that, they fabricated and weaved in threads that went nowhere. But, even with these ploys, we still get valuable information and they are off the street, unable to plot and coordinate future attacks.” POST, 12/26/2002 In legal papers to prepare for a military tribunal hearing in 2007, Zubaida himself will assert that he told his interrogators whatever they wanted to hear to make the torture stop. POST, 12/18/2007 Entity Tags: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Central Intelligence Agency, Abu Zubaida, Bruce Jessen, Ahmed Muhammad al-Darbi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Dan Coleman, Jose Padilla, Wayne Downing, Omar al-Faruq, James Elmer Mitchell, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics June 2002: US Aware Up to 3,500 Al-Qaeda Linked Militants Are Hiding in Pakistan’s Tribal Region In June 2002, US military officers in Bagram, Afghanistan, tell Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid that up to 3,500 al-Qaeda-linked militants are hiding out in the Pakistani tribal area of South Waziristan (see December 2001-Spring 2002). They say they cannot understand why the Pakistani ISI is turning a blind eye to them. Some Pakistani army units moved into the area in May, but they only patrol the administrative capitol of Wana. At the time, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is claiming he has no troops to spare for the tribal region due to tensions with India. 2008, PP. 268 Pakistan will not allow US troops to enter the tribal regions (see Early 2002 and After). Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region June 1, 2002: Bush Launches Doctrine of Preemptive Attack In a speech, President Bush announces a “new” US policy of preemptive attacks: “If we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” YORK TIMES, 6/2/2002 This preemptive strategy is included in a defensive strategic paper the next month (see July 13, 2002), and formally announced in September 2002 (see September 20, 2002). Despite the obvious parallels, the mainstream media generally fails to report that this “new” antiterrorism strategy was first proposed by Bush’s key administration officials in 1992 (see March 8, 1992) and has been continually advocated by the same people ever since. YORK TIMES, 9/20/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 9/21/2002; GUARDIAN, 9/21/2002 Furthermore, State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass originally drafted this new national security strategy. However, Condoleezza Rice had ordered that it be completely rewritten, reportedly wanting “something bolder.” The man responsible for this task was Philip Zelikow, who in 2003 will be appointed executive director of the 9/11 Commission (see Mid-December 2002-March 2003). 2004, PP. 316-317 Entity Tags: George W. Bush Category Tags: US Dominance Summer 2002: Police Seek Future Alleged Terror Mastermind over Relative’s Murder A man named Mohammed Saeed is stabbed to death in Birmingham, England. The police seek two subjects for questioning about the murder. One of them is Rashid Rauf, who will later be involved in a plot to blow up transatlantic airliners (see August 10, 2006). Rauf is currently studying at Portsmouth University, but leaves there without graduating and travels to Pakistan, in an apparent attempt to avoid the police. In Pakistan, Rauf marries into the family of Maulana Masood Azhar, founder of the militant organization Jaish-e-Mohammed. Azhar is well known in Britain, and Rauf’s association with him raises his standing with potential British radicals. 11/22/2008 Entity Tags: Rashid Rauf, Maulana Masood Azhar Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism June 3, 2002: Results of 9/11 Related Insider Trading Inquiries Are Still Unknown A rare follow-up article about insider trading based on 9/11 foreknowledge confirms that numerous inquiries in the US and around the world are still ongoing. However, “all are treating these inquiries as if they were state secrets.” The author speculates: “The silence from the investigating camps could mean any of several things: Either terrorists are responsible for the puts on the airline stocks; others besides terrorists had foreknowledge; the puts were just lucky bets by credible investors; or, there is nothing whatsoever to support the insider-trading rumors.” 6/3/2002 Another article notes that Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, the American investment banking arm of German giant Deutsche Bank, purchased at least some of these options. Deutsche Bank Alex Brown was once headed by “Buzzy” Krongard, who quit that company in March 2001 and became Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “This fact may not be significant. And then again, it may. After all, there has traditionally been a close link between the CIA, big banks, and the brokerage business.” LINE, 2/11/2002 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Deutsche Bank, A.B. (“Buzzy”) Krongard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge, Other 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation June 3, 2002: FBI Downplays Significance of Moussaoui’s E-mails Former FBI Deputy Director Weldon Kennedy states: “Even in the Zacarias Moussaoui case, there’s lots of uproar over the fact that the—there was a failure to obtain a warrant to search his computer. Well, the facts now are that warrant was ultimately obtained. The computer was searched and guess what? There was nothing significant on there pertaining to 9/11.” 6/3/2002 Three days later, the Washington Post reports: “Amid the latest revelations about FBI and CIA lapses prior to the September 11 attacks, congressional investigators say it is now clear that the evidence that lay unexamined in Zacarias Moussaoui’s possession was even more valuable than previously believed. A notebook and correspondence of Moussaoui’s not only appears to link him to the main hijacking cell in Hamburg, Germany, but also to an al-Qaeda associate in Malaysia whose activities were monitored by the CIA more than a year before the terror attacks on New York and Washington.” POST, 6/6/2002 Slate magazine later gives Kennedy the “Whopper of the Week” award for his comment. 6/7/2002 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Zacarias Moussaoui, Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weldon Kennedy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui June 4, 2002: President Bush Acknowledges Agencies Made Mistakes, Continues to Insist that 9/11 Could Not Have Been Prevented For the first time, Bush concedes that his intelligence agencies had problems: “In terms of whether or not the FBI and the CIA were communicating properly, I think it is clear that they weren’t.” TIMES, 6/5/2002 However, in an address to the nation three days later, President Bush still maintains, “Based on everything I’ve seen, I do not believe anyone could have prevented the horror of September the 11th.” MORNING HERALD, 6/8/2002 Days earlier, Newsweek reported that the FBI had prepared a detailed chart showing how agents could have uncovered the 9/11 plot if the CIA had told them what it knew about the hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar sooner. (FBI Director Mueller denies the existence of such a chart. POST, 6/3/2002 ) One FBI official says, “There’s no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together.” 6/2/2002 Attorney General Ashcroft also says it is unlikely better intelligence could have stopped the attacks. POST, 6/3/2002 Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, John Ashcroft, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, George W. Bush, Robert S. Mueller III Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar June 4, 2002: 9/11 Mastermind KSM Publicly Identified The photo of Mohammed on the right has been flipped to better compare it FBI Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is publicly identified as the “mastermind” behind the 9/11 attacks. He is believed to have arranged the logistics while on the run in Germany, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In 1996, he had been secretly indicted in the US for his role in Operation Bojinka (see January 6, 1995), and the US began offering a $2 million reward for his capture in 1998, which increased to $25 million in December 2001. PRESS, 6/4/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 6/5/2002 There are conflicting accounts on how much US investigators knew about Mohammed before 9/11. Mohammed is Pakistani (though born in Kuwait NEWS, 6/5/2002 ) and a relative of Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the WTC in 1993. YORK TIMES, 6/5/2002 Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed June 4, 2002: Officer with Possible Unique 9/11 Knowledge Is Reprimanded for Criticizing Bush Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Steve Butler is suspended from his post at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, and is told he could face a court martial for writing a letter to a local newspaper calling President Bush a “joke” and accusing him of allowing the 9/11 attacks to happen. The military prohibits public criticism of superiors. 6/5/2002; MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, 6/5/2002 What is not reported is that he may have had unique knowledge about 9/11: A hijacker named Saeed Alghamdi trained at the Defense Language Institute and Butler was Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs there (note that this is not the same person as the Steven Butler who later testifies before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry). NEWS SERVICE, 9/17/2001 Later in the month the Air Force announces “the matter is resolved” and Butler will not face a court-martial, but it is unknown if he faced a lesser punishment. RIDDER, 6/14/2002 Entity Tags: Steve Butler, Saeed Alghamdi, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism June 5, 2002: Al-Qaeda Operative Omar Al-Faruq Arrested, Heavily Interrogated Omar al-Faruq. Getty Images On June 5, 2002, Omar al-Faruq, a top al-Qaeda senior operative in Southeast Asia, is captured in the town of Bogor, Indonesia, by Indonesian agents after receiving a tip from the CIA. Curiously, later in the year, A.C. Manulang, the recently retired head of the Indonesian intelligence agency, will suggest that al-Faruq was actually a CIA mole assigned to infiltrate Islamic radical groups. Manulang will claim that the bombings that took place in Indonesia were actually the work of anti-Islamic intelligence agencies. 9/19/2002 In any case, al-Faruq is flown to the CIA interrogation center at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan where is subjected to months of intense interrogations. “It is likely, experts say, that… al-Faruq was left naked most of the time, his hands and feet bound. He may also have been hooked up to sensors, then asked questions to which interrogators knew the answers, so they could gauge his truthfulness,” the New York Times will later report. One Western intelligence official will tell the newspaper that al-Faruq’s interrogation was “not quite torture, but about as close as you can get.” For three months he is provided with very little food, subjected to sleep and light deprivation, prolonged isolation and temperatures ranging from 100 degrees to 10 degrees. On September 9, 2002, he reportedly breaks down and begins freely confessing all he knows (see September-October 2002). He provides information about “plans to drive explosives-laden trucks into American diplomatic centers and detailed information about people involved in those operations and other plots, writing out lengthy descriptions.” YORK TIMES, 3/9/2003 Entity Tags: Omar al-Faruq Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, 2002 Bali Bombings June 6, 2002: FBI Whistleblower Says FBI Is Overwhelmed with Paperwork, ‘Roadblocks’ to Investigations FBI agent Coleen Rowley, the whistleblower who wrote a stinging memo questioning the bureau’s handling of the Zacarias Moussaoui case (see May 21, 2002), testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Her memo, in which she accused FBI Director Robert Mueller of participating in what she called “a delicate and subtle shading/skewing of facts… at the highest levels of FBI management,” has become a focus of Congressional probes into what many lawmakers perceive as a systemic failure of intelligence gathering preceding the 9/11 attacks. Rowley calls the FBI a bureaucracy rife with “risk aversion,” “roadblocks” to investigations, and “endless, needless paperwork.” Rowley says she is concerned that the FBI has moved towards even more bureaucracy and micromanagement in the months following the attacks. 6/6/2002; BBC, 6/6/2002; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 6/6/2002 “Seven to nine layers” of management “is really ridiculous,” she says. “We need a way to get around the roadblocks.” But Rowley is more sympathetic to Mueller in her testimony than in her memo, and praises him for appearing willing to consider some of the new ideas and approaches that she says need to be implemented. YORK TIMES, 6/7/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 6/7/2002 In his own testimony before the same committee just hours before Rowley speaks, Mueller promises that Rowley will not be punished for speaking out, and admits that some of Rowley’s assessments are correct (see June 6, 2002). 6/6/2002 The questioning and commentary by the committee members varies somewhat by party affiliation, with Democrats such as Charles Schumer repeatedly praising Rowley “for performing a national service in coming forward,” but even committee Republicans such as Arlen Specter and Jeff Sessions engage in criticizing the FBI. YORK TIMES, 6/7/2002 Charles Grassley ® calls Rowley “a patriotic American who had the courage to put truth first and raise critical but important questions about how the FBI handled a terrorist case before the attacks, and about the FBI’s cultural problems.” ANGELES TIMES, 6/7/2002 Entity Tags: Robert S. Mueller III, Coleen Rowley, Charles Schumer, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Senate Judiciary Committee, Charles Grassley, Jeff Sessions, Arlen Specter Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui June 6, 2002: White House Uses Homeland Security Announcement to Divert Media Attention from FBI Testimony In a successful attempt to “steal” some media coverage from FBI agent Coleen Rowley’s testimony and concurrent media blitz (see June 6, 2002), the Bush administration counters with a public relations event of its own. The same day that Rowley testifies, President Bush announces the proposed creation of the new, Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—an agency proposed by Democrats and, up till now, one that Bush has vehemently opposed, preferring instead to make any such agency a subsidiary office within the White House. It will be the largest reorganization of the government since the implementation of the 1947 National Security Act, when the Defense Department, National Security Council (NSC), and CIA were created. To ensure that Rowley’s testimony does not dominate the headlines, Bush also gives an evening speech on prime-time television, again announcing the new department. In that speech, Bush calls the DHS the latest effort in the US’s “titanic struggle against terror.” In 2006, author and media critic Frank Rich will write that the announcement and speech “assure that Rowley’s whistle-blowing would be knocked out of the lead position on the next day’s morning shows and newspapers.” DHS will not be officially activated for almost six months (see November 25, 2002), but the announcement and subsequent speech succeeds in driving Rowley’s testimony off the front pages and the television broadcasts. Rich will write that the announcement of the capture of alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla (see June 10, 2002) four days later, even though Padilla had been in custody since May 8 (see May 8, 2002), further drives any mention or analysis of Rowley’s testimony out of the news. HOUSE, 6/6/2002; CNN, 6/7/2002; RICH, 2006, PP. 49-50 Entity Tags: Frank Rich, Bush administration, Coleen Rowley, US Department of Homeland Security, George W. Bush Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics June 6, 2002: FBI Director Mueller: FBI Whistleblower Correct in Some Assessments of Bureau’s Rigidity, Lack of Responsiveness FBI Director Robert Mueller testifies before the Senate Judiciary Committee, just hours before the testimony of FBI agent Coleen Rowley, whose accusations of FBI malfeasance before the 9/11 attacks have sparked Congressional interest (see June 6, 2002). Mueller promises the committee that Rowley will not be punished for speaking out, and admits that Rowley is correct in some of her assessments, including her insistence that the bureau change to meet the threats posed by loosely organized terrorist groups. “When we looked back, we saw things that we should have done better and things that we should have done differently, but we also saw things that were done well and things that we should do more,” Mueller tells the assembled lawmakers. 6/6/2002 Some senators take Mueller’s assessments even farther. Herbert Kohl (D-WI) says, “Had the FBI been totally alert and had the FBI used its current capabilities to the best of its ability, there was at least a very good chance that the terrorist plot could have been uncovered.” ANGELES TIMES, 6/7/2002 Refuses to Answer Questions about Presidential Discussions - Committee member Joe Biden (D-DE) repeatedly asks Mueller whether President Bush consulted with him before the 2001 reorganization of the nation’s domestic security apparatus under the Homeland Security rubric (see September 20, 2001). Mueller refuses to discuss his conversations with Bush. “There is no executive privilege here,” Biden says. “I’m asking you whether you were consulted. I think this is ridiculous.” Law enforcement officials later confirm that both Mueller and Attorney General John Ashcroft were consulted as part of planning for the reorganization. 'Antiquated' Computer System - Democratic senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) questions Mueller about the antiquated computer system used by the FBI (Rowley herself will testify that her agents could not search FBI files for information pertaining to their inquiry into so-called “20th hijacker” Zacarias Moussaoui—see August 21, 2001 and August 23-27, 2001). Mueller confirms that Rowley and agents working with her could not search for terms such as “flight school,” but instead were limited to single-word searches such as “flight” or “school,” which produced masses of irrelevant results. Schumer calls the FBI system “almost laughable,” and adds, “It just makes my jaw drop to think that on 9/11 or on 9/10 the kind of technology that is available to most school kids, and certainly every small business in this country, wasn’t available to the FBI.” Mueller says it will take two or three years to upgrade the FBI’s computers. “I think we are way behind the curve,” he says. Criticism of Civil Liberties Reductions - Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) criticizes Mueller for his decision, in conjunction with Attorney General John Ashcroft, to loosen restrictions on the FBI that limit the bureau’s ability to investigate and monitor citizen dissidents and organizations. “In particular, I’m troubled by the visa-holder-registration policy announced yesterday,” he says, referring to a Justice Department plan to require that about 100,000 foreigners in the United States be fingerprinted by the government. “Your agency is expending valuable time and resources to recruit these US citizens in our Arab and Muslim communities. And at the same time, the Justice Department is photographing, fingerprinting and registering their law-abiding siblings, cousins, visiting the United States.” YORK TIMES, 6/7/2002 “What impact do you think these policies will have on the Arab and Muslim communities in the US if you’re holding job fairs in the morning and fingerprinting them in the afternoon?” Kennedy asks. Mueller responds that the FBI will be careful not to step on anyone’s constitutional rights: “I still believe that we have to protect the freedoms that we have in this country that are guaranteed by the Constitution, or all the work we do to protect it will be at naught.” ANGELES TIMES, 6/7/2002 Entity Tags: Charles Schumer, John Ashcroft, Coleen Rowley, Herbert Kohl, Edward Kennedy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, Joseph Biden, Robert S. Mueller III, Senate Judiciary Committee, Zacarias Moussaoui Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui June 8, 2002 and After: Al-Qaeda Leader Captured in Morocco; Possibly Tortured There An al-Qaeda trainer named Abu Zubair al-Haili is captured in Morocco. A Saudi known as “the Bear” since he weighs over 300 pounds, he is said to have run training camps in Afghanistan and is believed to be head of al-Qaeda’s operations in North Africa. He is also thought to be one of al-Qaeda’s top 25 leaders. He had allegedly been working on a plot to bomb US and British naval ships in the Strait of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain. Seven other Saudis are arrested in Morocco in connection with the plot. One US official says al-Haili has “a wealth of information,” including details about al-Qaeda cells around the world. A senior Moroccan official says he was found based on a CIA tip that allegedly came from a detainee being held at the Guantanamo prison. 6/18/2002; MSNBC, 6/22/2005 What happens to him after his arrest remains unknown. ABC News soon reports that the US is in no hurry to take custody of him because the Moroccans “can use much more persuasive methods in questioning a suspect”—presumably a reference to torture. 6/19/2002 On September 9, 2002, USA Today will report that he is still being held in Morocco. TODAY, 9/9/2002 On September 15, 2002, The Independent will report that he is in US custody. 9/15/2002 Entity Tags: Abu Zubair al-Haili Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths June 10, 2002: Arrest of Supposed Al-Qaeda Plotter Jose Padilla Announced Jose Padilla. Florida Department of Motor Vehicles Attorney General Ashcroft announces the arrest of Abdullah al-Mujahir, a.k.a. Jose Padilla. He claims that Padilla was part of an al-Qaeda plot to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb” in a US city, and supposedly Padilla was scouting bomb targets when arrested. Padilla, a US citizen, is being held as an “enemy combatant,” allowing him to be held indefinitely. 6/11/2002; PBS, 6/11/2002 But almost immediately, doubts grow about this story. The London Times says that it is “beyond dispute” that the timing of the announcement of his arrest was “politically inspired.” Padilla was actually arrested a month earlier, on May 8. TIMES, 6/13/2002 It is widely believed that Ashcroft made the arrest announcement “only to divert attention from Intelligence Committee inquiries into the FBI and CIA handling of 9/11.” VOICE, 6/12/2002; INDEPENDENT, 6/12/2002; BBC, 6/13/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 6/13/2003 Four days earlier, Coleen Rowley testified before Congress. The FBI whistleblower stated her belief that the attacks of Sept. 11 could have been prevented had the FBI flight-school warnings been made available to the agents investigating Zacharias Moussaoui. STONE, 9/21/2006 Bush soon privately chastises Ashcroft for overstating claims about Padilla. 8/15/2002 The government attorneys apparently could not get an indictment out of a New York grand jury and, rather than let him go, made Padilla an enemy combatant. VOICE, 6/12/2002 It later comes out that the FBI found no evidence that he was preparing a dirty bomb attack and little evidence to suggest he had any support from al-Qaeda, or any ties to al-Qaeda cells in the US. Yet the Justice Department maintains that its view of Padilla “remains unchanged,” and that he is a “serious and continuing threat.” 8/15/2002 Because Padilla is a US citizen, he cannot be tried in a military court. So apparently he will simply be held indefinitely. It is pointed out that any American could be declared an enemy combatant and never tried or have that status questioned. FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 6/11/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 6/11/2002 The Washington Post says, “If that’s the case, nobody’s constitutional rights are safe.” POST, 6/11/2002 Despite the evidence that Padilla’s case is grossly overstated, the government won’t allow him access to a lawyer (see December 4, 2002; March 11, 2003). Entity Tags: Joint Intelligence Committee, Federal Bureau of Investigation, London Times, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Jose Padilla Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics June 11, 2002: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Richard Clarke Briefs Congressional Inquiry, Apparently Holds Back Information Damaging to Bush and Rice Richard Clarke, who was counterterrorism “tsar” in the run-up to 9/11, briefs the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry about counterterrorism before the attacks. Clarke's Status - Normally, a White House official such as Clarke would not be allowed to testify before Congress, but the administration makes an exception for him, although the testimony is behind closed doors and is classified. In addition, Clarke is not placed under oath and is not even considered a witness before the inquiry, just a briefer. Clarke’s boss, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, will not testify before the inquiry, and it is unable to obtain access to National Security Council files, which are privileged as they relate to advice given to the president. Content of Briefing - House Intelligence Committee member Tim Roemer will say that Clarke is riveting during the six-hour briefing. According to author Philip Shenon, Roemer thinks that Clarke is “intelligent, articulate, seemingly candid in discussing his own failings as White House counterterrorism ‘tsar’.” Clarke will later be extremely critical of President George Bush and Rice (see March 21, 2004 and March 24, 2004), but now he is “coy about certain questions—especially about President Bush and Condoleezza Rice.” Shenon will add: “If anyone knew whether Bush and Rice had reacted appropriately to the threats reaching the Oval office before 9/11, it was Clarke. Yet in front of these lawmakers, Clarke seemed unwilling to make any judgments about the president and Rice. He was certainly volunteering little about his bosses. He was still on the Security Council’s payroll. Perhaps it was understandable that Clarke would want to hold his tongue for now.” 2008, PP. 195-196 Later Positive Briefing about Administration's Record - Two months later, Clarke will give journalists a positive briefing about the Bush administration’s record on terrorism (see August 22, 2002). Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Philip Shenon, Tim Roemer Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry June 13, 2002: In Arrest of Al-Qaeda Strongman, Sudan Is Helpful; Saudi Arabia Is Not Sudan arrests an unnamed al-Qaeda leader who has confessed to firing a missile at a US plane taking off from Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, in May 2002. Saudi Arabia had failed to arrest him. This is just the latest in a series of events where “some countries long deemed key US allies—such as Saudi Arabia—are considered less than helpful in the war against terror, while other states remaining on the US State Department’s blacklist of terrorist sponsors, such as Syria and Sudan, are apparently proving more cooperative than their pariah status would suggest.” The US hasn’t been given access to al-Qaeda members arrested by Saudi Arabia, and “concerns over the Saudi authorities’ ‘unhelpful’ stance are increasing.” INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 7/5/2002 Entity Tags: United States, Al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia Category Tags: Saudi Arabia June 14, 2002: Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director Offers Support for Invasion of Iraq Philip Zelikow, who will later be appointed director of the 9/11 Commission (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003), makes public comments supporting the forthcoming invasion of Iraq. Zelikow says that “we’re now beginning to understand that we can’t wait for these folks to deliver the weapons of mass destruction and see what they do with them before we act.” He adds, “We’re beginning to understand that we might not want to give people like Saddam Hussein advance warning that we’re going to strike.” Zelikow will later help draft a policy paper used as justification for the invasion (see September 20, 2002) and will attempt to link Iraq to 9/11 when appointed to head the commission’s staff (see July 9, 2003, January 2004 and January 2004). 2008, PP. 128-129, 429 Entity Tags: Philip Zelikow Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Role of Philip Zelikow June 14, 2002: US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, Bombed, 12 Pakistanis Killed Damage near the US consulate in Karachi. Associated Press A car bomb explodes outside the US consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 12 Pakistanis and wounding 45. The building is considered one of the most heavily guarded in Pakistan. Several of the suspected bombers are later arrested, including a naval soldier and a paramilitary ranger. They say that the same car bomb had been positioned in April to assassinate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, but the bomb failed to explode. The explosives were allegedly provided by al-Qaeda. The bombers are said to have come from several Pakistani militant groups, working under the new name Lashkar-e-Omar, which is named after Omar Saeed Sheikh. He is alleged to have been involved in the 9/11 attacks and the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl. This is the last known bombing attributed to the group. YORK TIMES, 6/15/2002; RASHID, 2008, PP. 154 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Pervez Musharraf, Saeed Sheikh, Lashkar-e-Omar Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks June 14, 2002 and Shortly After: Al Jazeera Leak Leads US Intelligence to KSM and Bin Al-Shibh Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. Qatar embassy Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda recently interviewed 9/11 figures Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), though there are conflicting accounts about whether the interview took place before or after KSM was publicly identified as the 9/11 mastermind (see April, June, or August 2002). Author Ron Suskind will later claim in the book The One Percent Doctrine that on June 14, 2002, Fouda went to his superiors at Al Jazeera’s headquarters in Qatar and told them about the interview. He speaks to Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani, the chairman of Al Jazeera and the cousin of the emir of Qatar, and a few others. At this time, the US is intensely pressuring the Qatari government to get Al Jazeera to tone down what the US perceives as anti-American news coverage. In fact, it is widely believed in Qatar that the US deliberately bombed the Al Jazeera office in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November 2001 to send a message. Perhaps as a result of this pressure, a few days after Fouda reveals his interview, the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, tells the CIA all about it. Fouda described some of al-Qaeda’s operational plans and even had a good idea where the apartment was in Karachi, Pakistan, where the interview took place, and what floor he had been on. Suskind claims that “No one, not even Al Jazeera management, knew the emir was making the call” to the CIA. US intelligence begins an intense surveillance of Karachi in an attempt to find KSM and bin al-Shibh. Mostly because of this lead, bin al-Shibh will be arrested in Karachi in September 2002, around the time when Fouda’s interview is finally aired in public (see September 11, 2002). 2006, PP. 134-140 Interestingly, in early September 2002, it will be reported that KSM was arrested in an apartment in Karachi on June 16, 2002, which would be right about when the CIA was given this information (see June 16, 2002). Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al Jazeera, Central Intelligence Agency, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Yosri Fouda, Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 June 16, 2002: Article: US Officials Say Al-Qaeda Is Regrouping in Pakistan with Help from ISI Anonymous US officials tell the Los Angeles Times that Pakistan “has in effect replaced Afghanistan as a command-and-control center for at least some” of al-Qaeda. The group has formed or renewed alliances with local Muslim militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who are providing safe houses and other assistance. One US intelligence official says, “They don’t operate with impunity there like they did in Afghanistan, but they have lots of supporters, and it’s easy for them to blend in.” A Justice Department official agrees, saying that al-Qaeda operatives are able to go “wherever they want” in Pakistan’s cities. “They’re hiding in plain sight.” The article says, “Al-Qaeda leaders and followers have been arrested or tracked in nearly every major Pakistani city… In some cases, US officials say, Pakistani militants and even some members of the ISI have openly supported al-Qaeda and have used an informal underground railroad to help fleeing terrorists.” A recently retired US counterterrorism official says, “The ISI is filled with extremists, and I don’t think they’re trying very hard to find these people. In fact, they’re actively trying to hide them.” Publicly US officials continue to support the Pakistani government due to Pakistani help with certain things, such as allowing US troops to be stationed in Pakistan. But privately they are growing increasingly worried at the lack of cooperation regarding Islamist militancy. ANGELES TIMES, 6/16/2002 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Jaish-e-Mohammed Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region June 16, 2002: 9/11 Mastermind KSM Reported Captured In September 2002, articles appear in the Pakistani and Indian press suggesting that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is actually captured on this day in an apartment in Karachi. Supposedly he has been sent to the US, though the US and Pakistan deny the story and say Mohammed has not been captured at all. TIMES (LAHORE), 9/9/2002; TIMES OF INDIA, 9/9/2002; TIMES OF INDIA, 9/9/2002 Interestingly, it will later be reported that in mid-June 2002 the CIA learned about an Al Jazeera interview with KSM and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see April, June, or August 2002), and the information passed to the CIA included the apartment building and floor in Karachi where the Al Jazeera reporter believed the interview took place (see June 14, 2002 and Shortly After). Entity Tags: Yosri Fouda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed June 17, 2002: FBI Acknowledges Some Allegations by FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds In a lengthy unclassified hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee, FBI officials confirm translator Sibel Edmond’s allegations that co-worker Melek Can Dickerson had either mistranslated or incorrectly marked “not pertinent” hundreds of wiretapped telephone conversations involving certain surveillance targets with whom she had become friends (see (November 2001)). They also acknowledge that she had attempted to take control over all translation assignments involving those targets (see November 2001 or December 2001). The targets worked at the American-Turkish Council (ATC), where Dickerson was an intern before taking her job at the FBI. The FBI confirms also that Dickerson had failed to disclose this information on her application (see also (Late October 2001)), but nonetheless attributes her failure to translate these wiretaps to lack of training. AND GRASSLEY, 6/19/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 6/19/2002; UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1/24/2005; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 One of the participants of the hearing will later tell the New York Observer that the session was tense. “None of the FBI officials’ answers washed, and they could tell we didn’t believe them.” He remembers that one of the Congressional investigators told the officials, “You basically admitted almost all that Sibel alleged, yet you say there’s no problem here. What’s wrong with this picture?” YORK OBSERVER, 1/22/2004 Entity Tags: Senate Judiciary Committee, Federal Bureau of Investigation, American-Turkish Council, Melek Can Dickerson, Sibel Edmonds Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds Summer 2002-Summer 2004: 9/11 Investigations Glance over Intercepts of Hijackers’ Calls Both the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission examine the NSA’s intercepts of various calls made by the hijackers to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry refers to several of the calls and gives an idea of the content of some of them. But it does not mention those made by Nawaf Alhazmi and possibly other hijackers from the US after the USS Cole bombing, which are only disclosed later in the media (see Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001 and March 15, 2004 and After). However, this section of the Inquiry report is heavily redacted so most details remain unknown. It states that, although the NSA intercepted the calls and disseminated dispatches about some of them, the NSA did not realize the hijackers were in the US at the time the calls were made. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. XII, 11-12, 143-146, 155-157 The 9/11 Commission Report contains a briefer section on the intercepts and deals with those which led to the surveillance of the al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). In addition, it mentions that Almihdhar called his wife from San Diego in the spring of 2000, but fails to mention that his wife lived at an al-Qaeda communications hub and that the calls were intercepted by the NSA (see Spring-Summer 2000). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 181, 222 The Los Angeles Times comments: “The Congressional Inquiry and the Sept. 11 commission that came after it referred indirectly to the calls from Yemen to San Diego. But neither report discloses what the NSA gleaned from the calls, or why they were never disclosed to the FBI.” ANGELES TIMES, 12/21/2005 The publication of the 9/11 Commission report and revelations about domestic surveillance by the NSA will lead to increased media interest in and revelations about the intercepts starting from 2004 (see March 15, 2004 and After). Entity Tags: Hoda al-Hada, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Ahmed al-Hada Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry June 18, 2002: FBI Director Mueller Maintains 9/11 Attacks Could Not Have Been Prevented FBI Director Robert Mueller testifies before the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. His testimony will be made public in September 2002. PRESS, 9/26/2002 Mueller claims that with the possible exception of Zacarias Moussaoui, “to this day we have found no one in the United States except the actual hijackers who knew of the plot and we have found nothing they did while in the United States that triggered a specific response about them.” CONGRESS, 9/26/2002 The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later conclude near the end of 2002 that some hijackers had contact inside the US with individuals known to the FBI, and the hijackers “were not as isolated during their time in the United States as has been previously suggested.” ANGELES TIMES, 12/12/2002 Mueller also claims, “There were no slip-ups. Discipline never broke down. They gave no hint to those around them what they were about.” CONGRESS, 9/26/2002 Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III, Zacarias Moussaoui Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials June 18-19, 2002: Australian Intelligence Warns Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Could Attack Bali and Other Targets; No New Public Warning Results On June 18 and 19, 2002, the Australian Office of National Assessments (ONA) briefs Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on regional terrorist threats. Downer asks if there are targets in the region that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate, might hit. The ONA’s Indonesian specialist, David Farmer, replies that the Indonesian island of Bali and province of Riau, plus the country of Singapore, are the three most likely targets. Farmer says that “international hotels, nightclubs and airlines/airports are assessed as being high on terrorists’ target lists.” This is not based on any specific warning, but is an analysis based on an accumulation of information. Two weeks later, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) privately warns that “neither Jakarta nor Bali could be considered exempt from attack.” The Sydney Morning Herald will later comment that “although Australians have been told repeatedly that no ‘specific’ intelligence on Bali was available before October 12, dozens of reports by ASIO and the Office of National Assessments (ONA) warned of rising agitation in the region.… The intelligence agencies did not pass on just how detailed the internal warnings had become and the accompanying sense of foreboding.” MORNING HERALD, 7/15/2003; SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 5/29/2004 Entity Tags: Office of National Assessments, Alexander Downer, David Farmer, Australian Security Intelligence Organization, Jemaah Islamiyah Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, 2002 Bali Bombings, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 June 19, 2002: Republican Senator Leaks Classified Info on NSA Intercepts to Fox Reporter Richard Shelby (R-AL), the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, leaks highly classified information to Fox News political correspondent Carl Cameron just minutes after his committee learns it in a closed-door hearing with NSA Director Michael Hayden, according to later testimony. Shelby learns that telephone calls intercepted by the NSA on September 10, 2001 warned of an imminent al-Qaeda attack, but the agency failed to translate the intercepts until September 12, the day after the 9/11 attacks (see September 10, 2001). Cameron does not report the story, but instead gives the material to CNN reporter Dana Bash. A half-hour after Cameron’s meeting with Bash, CNN broadcasts the story, citing “two Congressional sources” in its report. CNN does not identify Shelby as a source. Moments after the broadcast, a CIA official upbraids committee members who have by then reconvened to continue the hearing. USA Today and the Washington Post publish more detailed stories on the NSA intercepts the next day. White House and intelligence community officials will quickly claim that the leak proves Congress cannot be trusted with classified information, but experts in electronic surveillance will later say the information about the NSA’s intercepts contains nothing harmful because it does not reveal the source of the information or the methods used to gather it. POST, 8/5/2004; NATIONAL JOURNAL, 2/15/2007 The next day, a furious Vice President Dick Cheney will threaten Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) with termination of the White House’s cooperation with the 9/11 Congressional inquiry unless Graham and his House Intelligence Committee counterpart, Porter Goss (R-FL), push for an investigation (see June 20, 2002). Shelby will deny any involvement in the leak (see August 5, 2004). Entity Tags: National Security Agency, Carl Cameron, CNN, Bob Graham, Al-Qaeda, Dana Bash, Michael Hayden, Richard Shelby, Senate Intelligence Committee, USA Today, Washington Post, Porter J. Goss, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Fox News Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry June 20, 2002: Afghan Council Appears Manipulated in Selecting Warlords The long-awaited loya jirga, or grand council, is concluded in Afghanistan. This council was supposed to be a traditional method for the Afghan people to select their leaders, but most experts conclude that the council is clearly rigged. 8/1/2002 Half of the delegates walk out in protest. 6/18/2002 One delegate states, “This is worse than our worst expectations. The warlords have been promoted and the professionals kicked out. Who calls this democracy?” Delegates complain, “This is interference by foreign countries,” obviously meaning the US. The New York Times publishes an article (“The Warlords Win in Kabul”) pointing out that the “very forces responsible for countless brutalities” in past governments are back in power. YORK TIMES, 6/21/2002 Entity Tags: Afghanistan, United States Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan June 20, 2002: Cheney Threatens to Terminate 9/11 Inquiry over NSA Leak Vice President Dick Cheney phones Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Bob Graham (D-FL). Cheney’s call comes early in the morning, and Graham takes it while still shaving. Cheney is agitated; he has just read in the newspaper that telephone calls intercepted by the NSA on September 10, 2001 warned of an imminent al-Qaeda attack. But, the story continues, the intercepts were not translated until September 12, the day after the 9/11 attacks (see September 10, 2001). Cheney is enraged that someone leaked the classified information from the NSA intercepts to the press. As a result, Cheney says, the Bush administration is considering terminating all cooperation with the joint inquiry by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees on the government’s failure to predict and prevent the attacks (see September 18, 2002). (Graham co-chairs the inquiry.) Classified records would no longer be made available to the committees, and administration witnesses would not be available for interviews or testimony. Furthermore, Cheney says, unless the committee leaders take action to find out who leaked the information, and more importantly, take steps to ensure that such leaks never happen again, President Bush will tell the citizenry that Congress cannot be trusted with vital national security secrets. “Take control of the situation,” Cheney tells Graham. The senator responds that he, too, is frustrated with the leaks, but Cheney is unwilling to be mollified. Quick Capitulation - At 7:30 a.m., Graham meets with the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter Goss (R-FL), and the ranking members of the committees, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL, who will later be accused of leaking the information) and Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). They decide to request that the Justice Department conduct a criminal inquiry into whether anyone on either committee, member or staffer, leaked the information to the press. One participant in the meeting later says, “It was a hastily made decision, made out of a sense of panic… and by people with bleary eyes.” Another person involved in the decision later recalls: “There was a real concern that any meaningful oversight by Congress was very much at stake. The political dynamic back then—not that long after September 11—was completely different. They took Cheney’s threats very seriously.” In 2007, reporter Murray Waas will observe that Cheney and other administration officials saw the leak “as an opportunity to undercut Congressional oversight and possibly restrict the flow of classified information to Capitol Hill.” Graham: Congress Victimized by White House 'Set Up' - In 2007, after his retirement from politics, Graham will say: “Looking back at it, I think we were clearly set up by Dick Cheney and the White House. They wanted to shut us down. And they wanted to shut down a legitimate Congressional inquiry that might raise questions in part about whether their own people had aggressively pursued al-Qaeda in the days prior to the September 11 attacks. The vice president attempted to manipulate the situation, and he attempted to manipulate us.… But if his goal was to get us to back off, he was unsuccessful.” Graham will add that Goss shared his concerns, and say that in 2003, he speculates to Goss that the White House had set them up in order to sabotage the joint inquiry; according to Graham, Goss will respond, “I often wondered that myself.” Graham will go on to say that he believes the NSA leak was not only promulgated by a member of Congress, but by White House officials as well; he will base his belief on the fact that Washington Post and USA Today reports contain information not disclosed during the joint committee hearing. “That would lead a reasonable person to infer the administration leaked as well,” he will say, “or what they were doing was trying to set us up… to make this an issue which they could come after us with.” White House Goes Public - The same day, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer tells reporters, “The president has very deep concerns about anything that would be inappropriately leaked that could… harm our ability to maintain sources and methods and anything else that could interfere with America’s ability to fight the war on terrorism.” Investigation Will Point to Senate Republican - An investigation by the Justice Department will determine that the leak most likely came from Shelby, but Shelby will deny leaking the intercepts, and the Senate Ethics Committee will decline to pursue the matter (see August 5, 2004). JOURNAL, 2/15/2007 Entity Tags: National Security Agency, George W. Bush, Bush administration, Bob Graham, Ari Fleischer, House Intelligence Committee, Nancy Pelosi, Senate Ethics Committee, Senate Intelligence Committee, Richard Shelby, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Porter J. Goss, US Department of Justice, Murray Waas Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry June 21, 2002: CIA Prepares Report on Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links Under Pressure from Administration The CIA issues a classified report titled, “Iraq and al-Qaeda: A Murky Relationship.” According to its cover note, the report “purposely aggressive in seeking to draw connections” between Iraq and Osama bin Laden’s organization. The document, which was prepared in response to pressure from the White House and vice president’s office, is heavily criticized by analysts within the agency. Analysts in the Near East and South Asia division complain that the report inflates “sporadic, wary contacts” between two independent actors into a so-called “relationship.” A complaint is filed with the CIA’s ombudsman for politicization. After interviewing 24 analysts, the ombudsman concludes that the report was crafted under pressure from the administration, later telling Senate investigators that “about a half-dozen analysts mentioned ‘pressure’ from the administration; several others did not use that word, but spoke in a context that implied it.” Despite being “purposely aggressive,” the report does not satisfy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, an adamant hawk who strongly believes Iraq is working closely with Islamic militant groups. In a memo to Donald Rumsfeld, he says that the report should be read “for content only—and CIA’s interpretation should be ignored.” POST, 10/20/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/28/2004; US CONGRESS, 7/7/2004, PP. 359; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 7/11/2004; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 112 Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links June 22, 2002: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Member Appears Biased in Defending FBI Internal FBI documents show that Thomas Kelley, in charge of matters relating to the FBI in the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, blocked an inquiry into the FBI’s role in Waco. For instance, an internal FBI memo from December 2000 states that Kelley “continued to thwart and obstruct” the Waco investigation to the point that a special counsel was forced to send a team to search FBI headquarters for documents Kelley refused to turn over. POST, 6/22/2002 Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Thomas Kelley Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry June 25, 2002: Suspicions of ISI-Al-Qaeda Links Continue Although the Western media continues to report that the ISI has reformed itself, “few in Pakistan believe it.” The Independent later reports rumors that on this day ISI officers hide three al-Qaeda members after a gun battle in which ten soldiers were killed. This follows several other betrayals—now the FBI and the other Pakistani law enforcement authorities no longer tell the ISI about their raids in advance. Other Pakistani investigators are forced to build files on militants from scratch, because the ISI will not share what it knows. 7/21/2002 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI